















NRC Non-Destructive Examination Research


Office of Nuclear Regulatory ResearchJeff HixonU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOctober 22, 2009





Why NDE?

Typical Pressurized Water Reactor








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Why NDE?










Cast SS Piping Welds



Above illustration courtesy of A. Chockie, Chockie Group International, Inc.

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


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Dissimilar Metal Welds






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NDE of Piping Welds




Typical Micro-structural Challenges





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Undesirable Performance Boundary (POD = 50%; FCP = 30%)

0.8

1.0

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0.2

0.2

0

 $\mathbf{0}$

False Call Probability

0.6


0.4



Performance Demonstration

- NUREG/CR-4464, Performance Demonstration Tests for Detection of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking
- NUREG/CR-4882, Qualification Process for Ultrasonic Testing in Nuclear Inservice Inspection Applications










Extremely Low Probability of Rupture (xLPR)








- Reactor Pressure Vessel inlet/outlet nozzle
- Steam Generator inlet/outlet nozzle
- Pressurizer surge (hot leg and pressurizer connections)
- Circumferential defects
 only

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Above illustration courtesy of A. Chockie, Chockie Group International, Inc.







Category	Application	Diameter Range (in)	Thickness Range (in)	Inspection Surface
А	Pressurizer Surge	12-14	1.2-2.3	Outside
B1	Reactor Vessel Nozzle	27-31	2.5-3.0	Inside
B2	Steam Generator Nozzle	27-31	5.0-5.2	Outside

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- PDI was formed to implement performance demonstration requirements of ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix VIII and 10CFR50.55a
- Database of demonstrations since mid '90s, world's largest
- Every candidate (personnel and procedure demos) must examine a set of realistic mockups with flawed and unflawed grading units and meet applicable acceptance criteria to qualify
 - Detection
 - Sizing (length and depth)
 - False calls

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




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Definition of POD in this study:

- Conditional probability of detecting a flaw during performance demonstration given the existence of a flaw within the procedure scope
- Field Application Variables were not addressed
- POD was developed from the PDI qualification program flaw detection results
- POD was calculated as function of flaw depth (% of wall thickness)
- Sizing uncertainty was not addressed
- Three categories of locations were selected based on configuration and examination procedure
- All original PDI data retained if needed for future use; truth state integrity preserved







- Passed (P): data and POD from qualification attempts that met both the detection and false call criteria
- Failed (F): data and POD from qualification attempts that failed either the detection or false call criteria or both
- Passed + Failed (P+F): data and POD obtained by combining the P and F results
- False call: declaring a flaw detection in an unflawed grading unit





- Fit the data with a POD model using binary regression (Hit/Miss analysis)
 - One-parameter logistic model for POD(x)
 - Independent variable: flaw depth, as % of thickness
 - Regression analysis produces maximum
 likelihood estimates for model coefficients β₁, β₂
- Result: six curves
 - Three categories (A, B1, B2)
 - Two cases (P and P+F)
- 95% upper and lower confidence bounds calculated for each curve

$$POD(x) = \frac{e^{\beta_1 + \beta_2 x}}{1 + e^{\beta_1 + \beta_2 x}}$$

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Calculations performed with 'R' code (publicly available statistical analysis package)

- Similar to MIL-STD-1823 implementation of "R" but with improvements by P. Heasler (PNNL)
 - Automated processing
 - Script (programming) provided by Heasler
 - Was able to solve for confidence bounds when MIL-STD software failed
 - Detailed output for documentation



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- PDI Data available only for flaws $\geq \sim 10\%$ T and $\leq \sim 90\%$ T
 - ASME App VIII flaw distribution criteria (10 30%, 30 60%, 60 90%)
 - Curves were extrapolated to 10%T and 100%T to avoid disclosure of actual minimum and maximum flaw sizes in test sets
 - Extrapolation is over a relatively small span
- False calls were not considered relevant to POD calculation
 - False call performance is documented separately in the report
- Three alternative POD models were evaluated (all available within 'R' code)
 - Log likelihood
 - Bayesian (confidence bounds equivalent to log likelihood)
 - Wald (confidence bounds not accurate in small data sets or when POD near 1 or 0)
 - All three produced identical POD curves
- Confidence bound calculations are different
- Log likelihood selected confidence bounds calculation preferred




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Flawed Grading Units Only

Category	Detection Attempts	Detections	Average Detection Rate
A(P)	1675	1582	94%
A(P+F)	2358	2131	90%
B1(P)	553	539	97%
B1(P+F)	590	576	98%
B2(P)	184	184	100%
B2(P+F)	258	249	97%





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Unflawed Grading Units Only

	Category	Attempts	False Calls	Average False Call Rate
A: Surge B1: RPV B2: SG	A(P)	5020	259	5%
	A(P+F)	7167	573	8%
	B1(P)	1467	34	2%
	B1(P+F)	1539	43	3%
	B2(P)	111	18	16%
	B2(P+F)	166	32	19%



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
 $POD(x) = \frac{e^{\beta_1 + \beta_2 x}}{1 + e^{\beta_1 + \beta_2 x}}$

Case	β ₁	β ₂	Standard Error β ₁	Standard Error β ₂
A(P)	2.7076	0.0031	0.2085	0.0045
A(P+F)	1.8789	0.0091	0.1348	0.0031
B1(P)	3.2440	0.0106	0.5490	0.0132
B1(P+F)	3.2996	0.0108	0.5493	0.0132
B2(P)	5.4089	0.0086	3.6423	0.0602
B2(P+F)	3.3148	0.0001	0.9516	0.0148

Flaw size is in units of %T

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


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Category B1(P+F)- RPV Nozzle-Safe End POD

Category B1 (P)- RPV Nozzle-Safe End POD




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Recent Publications

NUREG/CR-6982: Assessment of Noise Level for Eddy Current Inspection of Steam Generator Tubes

NUREG/CR-6933: Assessment of Crack Detection in Heavy-Walled Cast Stainless Steel Piping Welds Using Advanced Low-Frequency Ultrasonic Methods

NUREG/CR-6929: Assessment of Eddy Current Testing for the Detection of Cracks in Cast Stainless Steel Reactor Piping Components

NUREG/CR-6924: Non-destructive and Failure Evaluation of Tubing from a Retired Steam Generator

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